China's New Regional Trade Agreements by Whalley, John & Antkiewicz, Agata
  1





















University of Western Ontario, CIGI, NBER, 







The Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network is funded by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada but the 




This paper has been prepared as part of the Economic Governance Programme of the Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario. We are grateful to Li Wu Shi, Liang Fan, Yi Ming Wang, Shuming 
Zhang, and Terry Sicular for comments and discussion. We are grateful to a seminar group at University of Western 
Ontario for comments. 
 
   2
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the recent regional trade agreements that China has 
concluded rapidly following accession to the WTO in 2002. Agreements are in 
place with Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, and are 
either in negotiation or under discussion with South Africa, Chile, India, and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. These agreements differ sharply in form and 
substance, and involve process commitments to ongoing negotiation and 
cooperation on a wide range of issues. Differences relating to the regional 
agreements negotiated by the EU and the US are emphasized, as are later potential 
difficulties these agreements create in moving to an Asian trade bloc centred on 
them. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  Most of the recent discussion of Chinese trade policy from outside China has been of 
China's WTO accession, assessing both the commitments themselves and the process of 
implementation (Bhattasali, Li, and Martin (2004), Whalley (2003)). Less attention has been 
given to the network of post WTO accession regional trade agreements that China is now in the 
process of negotiating. Agreements, or initial frameworks of agreements are now in place with 
Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand. Discussions on possible FTAs with 
India, Chile, Singapore, South Africa, the Gulf Cooperation Council are underway. Possible 
direct or indirect arrangements involving Korea and Japan are the subject of speculation. Thus, 
what we may be witnessing with China's new regional trade agreements is the emergence of a 
third wave of large power regional agreements which will likely set the precedent for other 
Chinese regional agreements to follow in future years.  
 
  China, like other large powers in the trading system (the US and the EU) has clear 
incentive to commit to multilateral disciplines in the WTO as a way of gaining non 
discriminatory access to large markets and head off discrimination against her either in both 
these or smaller third country markets by fellow large powers. But closer to home (and as with 
the US and the EU) China has equally clear incentive to negotiate supplemental regional 
arrangements which deal with interests in local markets in ways which go beyond WTO 
disciplines. The US with NAFTA, and the EU with accession and other agreements have 
encountered similar incentives with similar results.  
 
  But there are several striking features of China's emerging network of agreements which 
differentiate it both from to the one off negotiation of NAFTA by the US in 1991 and the process 
of ever deeper EU integration initiated by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The first is the diversity of 
these agreements, both in form and coverage. For example, the agreement with Hong Kong is 
concrete and focused on both goods trade and cross border investment and financial activities, 
while the agreements with Australia and New Zealand are largely general indicative statements 
of intent in much wider number of areas. Diversity of approach while it seems to be the hallmark 
potentially makes the later emergence of an Asian trade bloc centred on these agreements more 
problematical.  
 
  A second feature is their seeming brevity, and hence the inevitably vagueness of the texts 
involved (the Hong Kong and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) have 
only thirteen pages of main text with additional annexes). Much seems to be left to subsequent 
joint agreement and mutual management of the trade relationship. A third feature is the absence 
(unlike especially the US agreements) of explicit and clear dispute resolution procedures with 
conciliation between the parties being relied upon. Other features are extensive lists of specific 
bilateral commitments in services (especially in the case of CEPA) which go beyond the form 
and type of commitments undertaken by most  WTO members in the GATS. Another is 
extensive attention devoted to arrangements both for joint ventures and the operation of financial 
institutions in a joint regulatory environment in the Hong Kong Arrangement.  
 
  The focus of recent US bilateral initiatives seemingly on gaining unilateral access for key 
service sectors in partner countries in return for accelerated bilateral tariff elimination (see Schott 
(2004)), and of recent EU bilaterals on wider diplomatic linkage to trade and competition policy 
(see Brenton (2002)) find no parallels in these emerging Chinese agreements. Instead, the   4
emphasis for now is primarily on trade access for manufactures through bilateral tariff 
reduction/elimination and bilaterally scheduled commitments in services. 
 
  The majority of literature on regional trade agreements from economists continues to treat 
them all as relatively similar in structure, despite the fact that the reality is quite different. Here a 
third set of agreements, further differentiated from the already different US and EU regional 
agreements, seem to characterize early Chinese regional negotiation, and more agreements seem 
likely to follow. We first discuss the Hong Kong CEPA agreement, next the China-ASEAN 
agreement, and the Australia, New Zealand agreements, and then what seems to be emerging on 
other fronts. We conclude with a discussion of what the Chinese interest may be in further 
elaborating this network of treaty arrangements in the future.  
 
 
2. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements with Hong Kong and Macao 
  
  China's Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong was signed 
on June 29
th, 2003 with the stated broad aims of promoting joint economic prosperity and 
development, and facilitating the further development of economic links between China, Hong 
Kong, and other countries (regions)
1. It contains 13 pages of text and 6 annexes. Its main content 
lies in progressive bilateral reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers applying to 
goods trade, reducing bilateral restrictions on service trade, and various steps to further promote 
bilateral trade and investment. As a formal free trade agreement, the Hong Kong CEPA was 
notified to WTO on January 12, 2004
2. So far a working party has not been established and 
factual examination by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements has not started yet. 
 
  Under the agreement Hong Kong maintains its current zero-tariff policy towards goods 
imported from the Mainland, with a staged tariff elimination for goods imported by China from 
Hong Kong. China agrees to introduce zero tariffs for a list of goods specified in Annex 1 as of 
January 1, 2004
3. Full elimination of bilateral tariffs will occur no later than January 1
st, 2006. 
All goods have to meet CEPA rules of origin (details on these rules are in Annex 2). Imports 
claiming origin must also be accompanied by a valid Certificate of Origin. To acquire Hong 
Kong origin a good must have 30% value added in Hong Kong (this includes the value of raw 
materials, labour costs, component parts, and product development costs). Foreign companies in 
Hong Kong can export goods to China under CEPA if the products meet the added value 
requirement. 
 
  The Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement is almost identical to the Hong 
Kong CEPA. The minor differences come from slightly different names of agencies and 
regulations in Hong Kong and Macao, and the lists of goods in Tables in Annexes 1 & 2 differ in 
some areas. Everything else is the same including the main text, Rules of Origin, and other 
requirements for entities operating in the Mainland.  The date of signing the documents was 
October 17, 2003 and the Macao CEPA has also been notified to WTO (in March 2004).  
 
  For non-tariff measures on goods these agreements specify that neither party is to 
                                                 
1See Preamble. 
2See Notification From Parties, WTO WT/REG162/N/1, Jan.12, 2004, and Minutes of Meeting of the Council  for 
Trade in Goods, WTO G/C/M/72, Jan. 26, 2004. 
3See Table 1 of Annex 1, 273 goods covering medicines, and toys, among others.   5
introduce new quotas or other barriers towards bilateral imports. Neither party will use any-
dumping actions against the other. CEPA allows for safeguards actions in goods trade after 
written notice, but these safeguards measures are seemingly not fully specified.  
 
  Bilateral liberalization of trade in services is specified in Annex 4 of both CEPAs. They 
each list 18 services sectors and specific bilateral commitments in each. The list includes (among 
others): management consulting, advertising, accounting, real estate and construction, logistics, 
freight forwarding, telecommunications and legal services. The agreement applies to financial 
activities, banking, insurance, and securities, and opens financial markets in the Mainland to 
entities from Hong Kong, CEPA for example lowers the required minimum assets for Hong 
Kong banks that establish branches in China from 20bn USD to 6bn USD.  
 
  A significant innovation in these agreements is that they define a new services entity, “a 
Hong Kong service supplier” (Annex 5) which opens doors to Chinese markets for international 
companies who can utilize this entity
4. Benefits from the bilateral scheduled commitments in 
services only apply to this entity. To qualify, such a company must be established in Hong Kong 
for no less than three years (5 years for construction, banking, insurance, and related services), 
pay applicable profit taxes, have business premises (owned or rented) reflecting business 
activities in Hong Kong, and employ at least 50 % of the staff locally from Hong Kong 
permanent residents. The intended business in China must be the same as the company's 
substantive business in Hong Kong , and documentation is required to establish this.  
 
  For the purposes of the agreement CEPA recognizes service companies acquired by an 
overseas company as a Hong Kong service company one year after the merger or acquisition 
takes place. Any qualifying Hong Kong company operating in China must have Hong Kong 
Service Supplier Certificate issued in Hong Kong. Annex 5 excludes any overseas company 
registered in Hong Kong that is “specifically established for providing certain services to its 
parent company”, e. g. representative offices and “mailbox companies”.  
 
  Both CEPAs also provide for cooperation in tourism and mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. In tourism the Mainland allows the residents of Guangdong to visit 
Hong Kong and Macao individually (at first on a trial basis in Dongguan, Zhongshan, and 
Jiangmen, then the entire province). The two countries also state their plan to promote bilateral 
tourism, jointly promoting programmes centred around the Pearl River Delta, and cooperate in 
raising the standard of services and protection of tourists. China and Hong Kong (Macao) aim to 
achieve mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Specific requirements and 
methodologies for qualification recognition are to be agreed through a consultative process with 
government authorities and professional bodies in the countries. 
 
  CEPAs contain trade and investment facilitation provisions under which China and Hong 
Kong (Macao) agree on seven areas of cooperation (trade and investment promotion, customs 
clearance facilitation, cooperation of small and medium sized enterprises, transparency in laws 
and regulations and others).  
 
  The overall coordination and implementation of each CEPA is the sole responsibility of a 
Joint Steering Committee who are to resolve disputes, and interpret provisions (Article 19). The 
                                                 
4 The Macao CEPA has a similar Macao service supplier company construct.   6
Committee comprises senior representatives or officials nominated by the two countries who will 
meet at least once a year. Special meetings can be held upon 30 days notice or request by either 
side. The functions of the Steering Committee include supervising the implementation of CEPA, 
interpreting the provisions of CEPA, resolving disputes, drafting additions and amendments to 
the content of CEPA, and supervising the working groups. All decisions of the Committee must 
be by consensus. Working groups of the Steering Committee are to be set up according to the 
needs of the parties and Liaison Offices are to be established both in the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce and the Hong Kong Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau (for the Macao 
CEPA, The Office of the Secretary for Economy and Finance of Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government).  
 
  In August 2004, further details of the arrangement between China and Hong Kong going 
beyond what was in the original CEPA were agreed and took  the form of a Record of 
Consultation on Further Liberalization under the Mainland and Hong Kong CEPA. This 
document states that progress on implementation of CEPA has been smooth and has had a 
positive impact on both economies, and then expands on the earlier agreement between the two 
sides.  
 
  In goods trade China agrees to apply zero tariffs to the next stage of goods imported from 
Hong Kong at the beginning of next year (2005). This includes 713 goods (and applies to both 
existing and planned production) covering food, chemical, mechanical and electronic products. 
Rules of origin for these goods (which maybe slightly different from those in the original CEPA) 
are to be concluded no later than October 2004. 
  
  In services trade China offers to further relax market access conditions for Hong Kong 
service suppliers (but without precisely specifying what relaxation is involved). This includes the 
11 sectors already specified in the original CEPA, and 8 new sectors including (among others): 
airport, information technology, job intermediaries, and marketing services. Most of these new 
commitments are to be implemented in January 2005.  
 
  The reaction to and comment on both of the CEPAs has been that since Hong Kong 
(Macao) is already one of the most open economies in the world and does not apply any 
significant barriers towards goods and services imported from China, each CEPA is effectively a 
one sided series of concessions by Beijing
5. Before signing the agreement only about 20% of all 
goods trade from Hong Kong to China were tariff free (it was 90% in 2004 after CEPA 
implementation)
6. To the extent this is the case, one can argue that China gains little from the 
CEPAs on the trade front except for the freedom from anti-dumping actions by Hong Kong 
(Macao) against China.  
 
  But these CEPAs will likely have a larger impact on services trade and here joint interests 
come into play. In most of the specified sectors Hong Kong (Macao) service companies will gain 
improved access to Chinese markets and sooner than those from other countries waiting for the 
implementation of China's WTO accession commitments. China promotes Hong Kong service 
providers over third country competitors, and given the closeness of the relationship involved 
and with eventual reintegration this may be seen in China as in the Chinese interest. A issue 
skeptics might arise is whether local regulations in China may anyway prove to be the binding 
                                                 
5See Business Asia, July 14, 2003. 
6See EIU ViewsWire, Sep. 30, 2003.   7
restriction for Hong Kong companies operating in Mainland and CEPAs provisions in reality 
will be of little importance. 
 
  China also may be planning to use the CEPAs to attract Hong Kong  (Macao) 
professionals to its services markets so that they can then train Chinese workers
7. New rules for 
individual tourists coming to the Mainland from Hong Kong are also seen as a way of bringing 
the bilateral relationship closer in addition to immaculate economic benefits. While these CEPAs 
may  be largely another step in Mainland – Hong Kong (Macao) integration but without too 
much of an impact on the Chinese economy before China – WTO agreements comes fully into 
force in 2007, but they are nonetheless precedents for further Chinese regional agreements. 
 
 
3.  The ASEAN – China Agreement 
 
  China and ASEAN signed a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation in November 2002. It is less concrete than the CEPAs and only sets out a broad 
framework for more detailed agreements that are to follow. It contains 21 pages of text and 4 
annexes. Its main stated objectives are: economic, trade and investment cooperation, progressive 
liberalization of trade in goods and services, creation of a liberal and transparent investment 
regime, and closer economic integration within the region
8.  
 
  Under the agreement the parties have agreed to work towards the establishment of a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) between China and ASEAN within 10 years, but precisely what this FTA will 
comprise and what its institutional underpinnings will be remain for now unclear. What will be 
sought in CAFTA will be elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in goods trade, 
liberalization of services trade, promotion of bilateral investment within the FTA, and 
simplification of customs procedures and the establishment of mutual recognition arrangements. 
The China-ASEAN Agreement has not been notified to WTO, but the eventual CAFTA will 
presumably be.  
 
Under the agreement, China and ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) with the original ASEAN 6 
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) is to be established by 2010 
and by 2015 with the newer ASEAN members (Viet Nam, Lao PDR and Myanmar, Cambodia). 
Bilateral tariffs will be lowered to 0-5% on most goods, and non-tariff barriers are to disappear.  
 
  The goods subject to reduction/elimination, along with tariff rates and schedules 
(involving both a Normal and a Sensitive Track as per Article 3, Paragraph 4 of the agreement) 
and rules of origin are to be negotiated by the parties, and spelled in more detailed agreements to 
follow. Any bilaterally agreed safeguard arrangements and disciplines on subsidies, anti-
dumping measures are to be based on existing GATT disciplines and are also to be elaborated.  
 
  As far as trade in services is concerned, the parties plan to negotiate progressive 
elimination of all discrimination in new and existing service restrictions (unless permitted under 
GATS). In the investment area, the parties are to liberalize their investment regimes, strengthen 
cooperation, and improve transparency of rules and regulations. 
 
                                                 
7See China Staff, Feb. 2004. 
8See Preamble   8
  A key element in the 2002 ASEAN-China agreement is an Early Harvest Programme set 
to start in 2004 (Annex 1). The Programme will cut tariffs ahead of the planned establishment of 
the CAFTA in 2010 (it is also called a “trial move”). Eight categories of agricultural products 
(about 600 different goods) with exclusions are itemised in Annex 1. Depending on the product 
category involved, zero tariffs between China and ASEAN 6 under the Early Harvest Programme 
are to be in place at the latest by 2006, and not later than 2010 between China and the newer 
members of ASEAN. 
 
  The only ASEAN country not to participate in this Early Harvest Programme is the 
Philippines who argued that their agricultural sector could not withstand the liberalization (one 
issue is illegal imports of Chinese agricultural products in the Philippines). Additional goods can 
be added to this programme by negotiation (between China and individual ASEAN members). 
 
  The agreement also covers other areas of possible bilateral cooperation outside of trade in 
goods and services (Part 2). The parties agree to cooperate (in as yet unspecified ways) in 
agriculture, information and communications technology, human resources development, 
investment, Mekong River basin development, banking, finance, transport, energy development, 
tourism. All discussions on cooperation are to take place in the ASEAN-China Trade Negotiation 
Committee. Cooperation will also cover promotion and facilitation of trade and investment 
through agreed standards (and conformity assessment); agreement on technical barriers to trade 
and non-tariff measures, customs cooperation; increasing the competitiveness of small and 




  Under CAFTA the Chinese markets covered by the early harvest programme will be 
opened for ASEAN countries ahead of the schedule negotiated for goods trade more broadly 
under China's WTO accession agreements. Trade between China and ASEAN continues to grow 
but still represents only 3% of exports and 5% of imports for the ASEAN 6. China will gain from 
more open markets for her manufacturers and a more stable supply of raw materials (ASEAN is 
China's fourth largest supplier)
10. The CAFTA may also bring faster liberalization within the 
ASEAN itself as non-tariff barriers affecting goods and services trade towards China are 
removed. 
 
  China’s 2002 Framework Agreement with ASEAN was initially seen as largely symbolic, 
but that perception has changed as China has pushed strongly in negotiations on the Annexes to 
the Agreement. ASEAN is China's fifth largest trading partner, and China clearly hopes to 
strengthen her position in ASEAN markets. In China, the argument is made that CAFTA may be 
the first step for China in creating an economic counterforce to the US and Europe and may also 
help in any future negotiations on creating an all-Asian FTA. 
 
  Two-way trade between China and ASEAN increased by 40% in 2003
11. In January 2004 
it increased a further 15.4% year-on-year (6.4 billion USD). China's exports to ASEAN reached 
8.1 billion USD in the first quarter of 2004 (up 31.9% year-on-year); imports increased to 13.8 
billion USD (up 42.5%). China's imports of fruit and vegetables from ASEAN (where tariff cuts 
under the Early Harvest Programme occurred) increased by 38.7% year-to-year in the first six 
                                                 
9See Article 7, Paragraph 3. 
10See M. Vatikiotis, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 2003. 
11See Bo Xilai in China Daily, Sep. 5, 2004.    9




4.  Chinese Regional Agreements with Australia and New Zealand 
 
  Besides the CEPA agreements and CAFTA China has also signed two broad initial 
framework agreements with Australia and New Zealand. These set out the emerging structure of 
trade, investment, and the wider economic relationship with two OECD countries in the region, 
and may indicate how China plans to proceed in regional agreements with other OECD 
countries. 
Australia 
  A Trade and Economic Framework between Australia and China was signed in October 
2003. This sets out areas of future cooperation which aim to “achieve balanced and 
comprehensive trade and investment facilitation and liberalization”
14. The text is brief. It 
contains 3 pages and has 2 Annexes (Annex 2 is 6 pages long). Paragraph 2 and Annex 1 
indicate the specific areas where the parties will promote strategic cooperation and seek to create 
favourable conditions for trade and investment. 
 
  In energy and mining, China and Australia state their wish to improve their joint 
regulatory and policy climate, cooperate in training, research and development, and promote 
business linkages and exchanges. Also, arrangements will be concluded on a Natural Gas 
Technology Partnership Fund to enhance mutual understanding in the field of clean energy.  
 
  In textiles, clothing, and footwear China and Australia commit to hold regular trade fairs 
and exhibitions, encourage the development of business links and contacts, and support joint 
ventures and joint development of brands.  
 
  In agriculture and quarantine inspection China and Australia will cooperate further under 
existing agreements (e.g. the 1984 Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation and the 1984 
Protocol on a Program of Cooperation in Agricultural Research for Development) and conclude 
other MOUs and Protocols (a Plant Quarantine Protocol on Australian Wheat and Barley Imports 
into China, a MOU on Cooperative Activities in Water Resources, and a MOU on Cooperation 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Matters).  
 
  They will also strengthen communication and consultation mechanisms regarding 
quarantine procedures to improve transparency and facilitate compliance and trade. The text is 
not detailed, but mentions a dialogue on quarantine management regulations, registration policies 
and other practices, consultation on food safety inspection and certification issues, and concrete 
actions to facilitate business and commercial linkages and exchanges. 
 
  Investment between the two countries will be enhanced through information exchanges, 
                                                 
12See Zhang Jin, China Daily, Apr. 8, 2004. 
13The first country to experience zero tariffs in China under the Early Harvest Programme was Thailand from June 
2003 (went into force in October 2003). Thailand's exports of vegetables increased in the first quarter of 2004 by 
38%, and fruit by 80%. Thailand's exports of fruit and vegetables accounted for over 60% of ASEAN's total 
exports to China in the first half of 2004. 
14See Paragraph 1.   10
improved transparency and predictability of measures, and protection of investors and 
investments. The parties also commit to build institutional linkages between Australian and 
Chinese government agencies to promote cooperation and consultation. 
 
  In the services area the parties plan to cooperate on education and training through mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications, joint labour services, and facilitation of travel for 
Chinese personnel to Australia. The parties also plan to work together on engineering, resources 
and mining development projects. There are few details but the possibility is raised of Chinese 
firms investing under contract in Australian projects in these fields.  
 
  In information and communications technology and e-commerce, the two countries plan 
to intensify their cooperation under an existing 1999 MOU. The countries will promote a 
dialogue between their customs agencies to simplify and facilitate trade, promote the 
development of e-commerce, and enhance cooperation in law enforcement. In intellectual 
property, the countries state their wish to cooperate and to work together bilaterally, regionally 
and multilaterally. In matters of public health, the countries plan to cooperate under an existing 
1993 MOU on Health Cooperation. The countries will also conclude a MOU on cooperation in 
food safety.  
 
  In the area of technical barriers to trade, the countries will seek to improve trade 
facilitation by concluding a bilateral understanding supplementing multilateral commitments for 
quality supervision, inspection and quarantine, and strengthening communication and 
consultation mechanisms. They will also strengthen cooperation in standards, certification and 
accreditation including exchanges between officials and experts, and conclude a mutual 
recognition agreement covering mechanical and electronic products.  
 
  The countries will also explore possibilities for improved facilitation of visa procedures 
for both work and business visas, support industry and business groups working on strengthening 
bilateral trade, and in the anti-dumping area the countries plan to set up bilateral mechanisms for 
anti-dumping notification so that any conflicts can be better resolved through dialogue and 
consultation. 
 
  The Framework also stresses the importance of regular bilateral meetings, and their wish 
to strengthen the existing Joint Ministerial Economic Commission. Australia and China also 
agree to a Joint Feasibility Study in which the parties will explore the possibilities for a formal 
FTA
15. This Study is to provide an overview of recent trends in bilateral trade and economic 
relations, assess recent international trade policy developments and the possible implications for 
Australia-China trade and investment, identify and describe existing barriers  to trade and 
investment flows (in goods, services, and investment), identify possible cooperation measures to 
promote trade and investment liberalization, assess the impact of the removal and/or reductions 
of existing barriers in trade of goods and services, investment, and make recommendations re 
options for future action. The study is to be completed by end of 2005. The Agreement also 
states that any future FTA talks can only proceed on an “equal basis”. Before the FTA 
negotiations start, Australia will consider recognizing China as market economy which is 
important to China in its dealings with antidumping measures in countries, such as the US, who 
use different procedures against exporters designated as non-market economies. 
                                                 
15See Annex 2.   11
  China is currently the second largest trading partner of Australia (China overtook the US 
last year), and Australia is China's ninth largest partner. In 2003 Australia had a trade surplus 
with China of over 13.5 billion USD reflecting exports of iron ore, copper, and petroleum
16. 
New Zealand 
  China and New Zealand signed a Trade and Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement similar to that with Australia in May 2004. In this, the parties state their interest in 
seeking “comprehensive trade and investment facilitation and liberalization through all-round 
economic and trade cooperation”
17 and also agree areas of further negotiation.  
 
  Paragraph 2 lists specific areas of “significant mutual economic potential” where the 
countries will promote strategic cooperation. Annex 1 contains the details. In agriculture, animal 
husbandry, forestry, biosecurity, food safety, the parties will strengthen cooperation and further 
development of Joint Commissions established in 2001. In wool, development of trade will be 
promoted using the trade organizations in the countries. New Zealand also offers to help China 
through training and technological cooperation in these areas.  
 
  In science and technology, the parties will further develop an Agreement on Cooperation 
in Science and Technology signed in 2003. They will also seek to enhance cooperation between 
the two countries research and innovation communities. 
 
  In technical barriers to trade, the parties plan to base their cooperation on the WTO/TBT 
mechanisms. The issue is how to strengthen communication and consultation on technical and 
inspection regulations and standards so that reductions in costs to business are achieved. The aim 
is to conclude a cooperative framework programme for quality supervision, inspection, standards 
and conformity assessment, and also to enhance arrangements for consultation between 
certification agencies to support recognition of each other's testing and certification 
requirements. The aim is also to enhance cooperation in WTO-related training for Chinese 
personnel. The plan is to utilize the China-Australia-New Zealand Standard Wool Contract, 
establish liaison channels, enhance contacts and linkages, and adopt administrative measures to 
deal with outstanding issues. 
 
  In information and communication technology and e-commerce, the two countries will 
encourage cooperation through the development of a memorandum of understanding. In services 
the parties will seek to expand trade in services and explore possibilities for cooperation, 
especially in education, tourism, air services, and labour and professional services. In investment 
the parties aim to increase investment volumes by exchanging information, enhancing 
transparency and predictability, protecting investments and investors, and building institutional 
linkages to promote investment visits, B2B initiatives, conferences, and other innovations. 
 
  The agreement also covers environmental protection. The two countries agree to share 
information and cooperate on promoting environmental protection, resource management, and 
protection of biodiversity. The countries also stress the importance of intellectual property rights 
and plan to also cooperate in this area.  
 
                                                 
16See China Daily, Aug. 18, 2004. 
17See Paragraph 1.   12
  In customs cooperation, the countries plan to update the existing 1995 Cooperative 
Arrangement with new initiatives on trade facilitation and security. They will promote 
communication between customs administrations, electronic commerce strategies, and 
information sharing. They also recognize the importance of strengthened law enforcement and 
cooperation to prevent customs offenses. The countries plan to simplify application procedures 
for business visas, shorten processing times, and facilitate long term working visas for business 
travellers.  
 
  As with the Australian Framework Agreement there is stress on the importance of regular 
bilateral meetings between leaders and ministers. The countries will establish a Joint Ministerial 
Commission as a forum for a dialogue on joint trade and economic issues. China and New 
Zealand will also strengthen both the position and role of the Joint Trade and Economic 
Commission and other sectoral Joint Commissions. 
 
  Unlike Australia, New Zealand immediately recognizes China as a market economy and 
agrees not to implement any anti-dumping measures against China under the sections 15 and 16 
of the WTO accession protocol, and paragraph 242 of the Report of the Working Party on 
China's accession to the WTO. The parties commit (as with Australia) to undertake a Joint 
Feasibility Study
18 on a bilateral Free Trade Agreement and commence negotiations on 
establishing a FTA as soon as possible (possibly in early 2005).  
 
  China – New Zealand FTA negotiations will be the first China will start with a developed 
country, and there are clear reasons for China choosing New Zealand in this way. New Zealand 
has a one-China policy, recognized China early in the 1970's and reached early agreement on 
China's accession to WTO
19. New Zealand has also become the first developed country to 
recognize China as market economy.  
 
  China is New Zealand's fourth largest trading partner, and the third largest purchaser of 
lamb and dairy, and fifth largest of forest products
20. China-New Zealand trade was 1.8 billion 
USD in 2003, with over 30% growth year-to-year. For China an FTA with New Zealand is a 




5.  Other Potential Chinese Regional Agreements 
 
  While formal agreements involving China are limited to the two CEPA agreements, 
ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand, several others are seemingly in process with negotiations 
likely to be launched soon. 
 
  A key case is India. There is no official text of any pre-FTA agreement between India and 
China so far, but both countries appear to be moving towards FTA negotiations. In the past there 
have been disputes regarding borders issues between the countries, but it now seems that they 
now share common interests in trade and also in WTO matters.  
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19See Colin James, Far Eastern Review, Apr. 22, 2004. 
20See Chen Mingming, The New Zealand Herald, Aug. 31, 2004. 
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  After the Indian Prime Minister's visit to China in June 2003 a joint Declaration was 
signed. In the Declaration the two countries noted their mutual desire for good bilateral relations, 
and their common interests. In the area of trade, China and India plan to take measures consistent 
with the national laws and international obligations to remove impediments to bilateral trade and 
investment
22. China and India have started discussing possible bilateral trade arrangement on 
preferential tariffs (more preferential than the MFN tariffs) on a range of products: including 
paper, steel, chemicals, and food. The list includes 217 Indian exports and 188 Chinese exports 
facing lower than average tariffs in the other market
23. In June 2003, the two countries agreed to 
form a Joint Study Group to explore the potential for expanded bilateral trade and cooperation
24. 
The resulting India-China Group met in March 2004 with the aim of preparing a five year 
blueprint for enhanced bilateral trade and cooperation to present to the two governments
25.  
 
  The first meeting discussed possibilities for both a comprehensive economic cooperation 
agreement and a India-China free trade agreement. The Group is to present its findings by the 
end of 2004
26. A second meeting of the Joint Group was held in July 2004 in New Delhi with the 
aim of fostering cooperation between the two business communities
27.  
 
  Chile and China officially announced in April 2004 plans for a feasibility study regarding 
the possibilities for strengthening trade and economic cooperation, and a possible free trade 
agreement. The study is to evaluate the possible impacts of a free trade agreement between the 
two countries in different sectors and on overall economic relations. The group working on the 
study is composed of specialists from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chilean 
DIRECON (General Directorate of International Economic Affairs – government agency) with 
experts from ministries of finance, economics, agriculture, mining and transport, and the central 
bank
28. The study will cover goods, services and investments; the study is to be presented not 
later than October 2004. It is expected the negotiations towards the FTA between China and 
Chile will start this year during the November APEC meeting in Chile. Also, at this meeting 
Chile will probably announce their recognition of China's market economy status.  
 
  Chile is China's third largest trade partner in South America and due to large imports of 
copper and pulp China has a trade deficit with Chile. Chinese exports to Chile are mainly limited 
to low-value manufactured goods (textiles and footwear). A FTA will help China further develop 
the Chilean market and creates the possibility of further penetration of South American markets.  
 
  There are opinions that China chose Chile as their first possible FTA partner in South 
America because Brazil is currently undergoing economic reforms and restructuring, and also 
because Chile is not as economically tied to the US as Mexico. Chile's economy depends heavily 
on foreign trade and 75% of Chile's foreign trade is currently covered by various FTAs 
(including Canada, the US, the EU, Norway, Finland, Mexico)
29.  
 
  A further area of bilateral activity for China is South Africa. In June 2004 China and 
                                                 
22See The India and China Declaration on Principals for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation. June 23, 2003. 
23See Deccan Herald, July 26, 2003. 
24See S. Sethuraman, The Kashmir Telegraph, Aug. 2003. 
25See Outlook India, Mar. 22, 2004. 
26See P.S. Suryanarayana, The Hindu, Mar. 24, 2004. 
27See India Daily, July 26, 2004. 
28See Press release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Apr. 27, 2004.  
29See Wang Li, China Daily, May 10, 2004.   14
South Africa issued a joint communiqué in which South Africa granted China market economy 
status. In the communiqué, China and South Africa also announced their plan to launch FTA 
negotiations. In the declaration, the two countries stated they would work on encouraging 




  There is also bilateral activities with the Middle East. In July 2004 China and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) announced in a 
joint communiqué that they had signed a Framework Agreement on Economic, Trade, 
Investment and Technological Cooperation. Under this, the two countries agree to encourage 
cooperation and technological exchanges, expand trade, and promote mutual investment. They 
also establish a joint committee for cooperation to implement the agreement and create a 
consultation mechanism. Furthermore, China and the GCC agree to launch negotiations on a 
Free Trade Agreement (the dates have not yet been set)
31.  
 
  If established a China-GCC FTA would be the second Chinese agreement with a regional 
group, the ASEAN agreement being the other. China’s aim would be to benefit from secure oil 
imports from the Gulf countries and expand exports of garments, fabrics, and electronics to the 
region. China also seeks increased GCC investment in water and electricity supply, energy and 




  Elsewhere in Asia, Singapore and China have started consultations on a possible FTA 
after China concluded the ASEAN Agreement. Talks were scheduled to start in November 2004, 
but now it seems that China wants to delay them following the Singapore Deputy Prime 




6.  Evaluating Regional and Multilateral Objectives in China’s Trade Policy 
 
In embarking upon negotiation of this ever-growing network of regional trade agreements 
China has followed a path similar to that chosen by the other large entities in the trading system 
(the US and the EU). A striking feature of the Chinese approach, however, is the speed at which 
this both has been and is being done given accession to the WTO only occurred in 2002. Equally 
striking is the seeming difference in the structure of these regional agreements compared to those 
of the US and the EU. Recent US and EU bilateral agreements tend to follow a common template 
structure. Not only is the template different in the Chinese case, it is much more varied making 
the eventual emergence of an Asian trading bloc centred around these arrangements 
problematical. This seemingly reflects both a pragmatism in recognizing differences across 
partners, but also the clear linkages being established between seemingly conventional trade 
interests and China's interests in wider economic, diplomatic and strategic relationships. The 
approach seems to be one of pragmatic management of a series of bilateral relationships in 
customized manner, in which conventional economic and trade agreements, such as tariff based 
free trade areas of customs unions, are merged into broader more encompassing relationship 
                                                 
30See China and Chile Joint Communique, June 29, 2004. 
31See China and GCC Joint Communique, July 7, 2004. 
32See Bo Xilai, Ministry of Commerce release, July 9, 2004.  
33See Agence France Presse, August 3, 2004 and July 25, 2004.   15
building rather than precise narrower legal text. 
 
A natural question to ask is whether this course of action is in the Chinese interest. If 
China is so firmly committed to multilateralism and WTO disciplines as is often espoused, then 
why is China not content to leave the setting of its trade agreements with regional partners 
simply to WTO disciplines and process? And why negotiate in this varied way with different 
partners? 
 
  A first response to these questions is to note the conflicting interests of all larger powers 
in both multilateralisation in abstract, and in the WTO trading system in its present compromised 
multilateral guise. The incentive of the large powers given the present system is seemingly to 
both espouse and abide by WTO non discrimination and MFN in their trade relationships with 
each other, trying to firm up non discriminatory access to large markets and also to share in 
benefits negotiated by other large powers in third markets, while at the same time using their 
asymmetry in power to negotiate preferential agreements with local smaller partner countries. 
This suggests an inevitability to a two tier international trading system of common multilateral 
disciplines involving all countries, and largely reflecting the interests of large powers in their 
arrangements with each other, and regional disciplines going beyond multilateral arrangements 
and reflecting the dominant interest of a large power in any given smaller market. This seems the 
reality of the WTO system in place today. 
 
  If this position is accepted, along with an inherent asymmetry in power between large and 
smaller countries, then the coexistence of both multilateral WTO disciplines and a 
supplementary system of regional disciplines becomes an inevitability. From China’s point of 
view, then the issue is what form of regional agreements should be negotiated, not whether they 
should be negotiated.  
 
  This leads naturally to the issue of whether the form of and modality for these 
negotiations fits China’s interest? Seemingly in proceeding sequentially by country, and in first 
negotiating with Hong Kong where the form of agreement can be more easily shaped than in 
other cases and the precedent then used in subsequent negotiations the approach seems to fit the 
national interest well. Precedent can be established in early simple cases, much like early US 
bilaterals with Singapore and Chile in their recent wave of negotiations. And the twin objectives 
of building towards a regional structure in Asia, and in negotiating with entities other than the 
US and the EU so as to enhance negotiating power with other large entities in the WTO seems to 
be in the natural interest.  
 
Also using a structure of initial framework negotiation with sequential elaboration 
through further negotiation more concessions may be eventually extracted, and learning as 
negotiations proceed can occur seems to fit well. Equally, the absence of formalized dispute 
settlement, and reliance on conciliation would seem to fit the Asian way. And in customizing 
agreements to fit partner characteristics, prior elements of the relationship, and strategic 
considerations, the Chinese approach to bilateral commercial engagement seemingly displays a 
pragmatism less evident with the US and the EU. 
 
  Thus where questions arise lie more with the coverage of these agreements. Compared to 
the regional agreements negotiated by the EU and the US, China’s regional agreements are more 
centrally focused on the conventional WTO spheres of trade in goods and services. Other non   16
WTO areas such as special sectoral arrangements, possible tax harmonization, innovative dispute 
settlement, coverage of environment and non-trade matters, and financial integration as appear in 
NAFTA and the Treaty of Rome are seemingly less central to these agreements in their present 
form. While this may change, it may for now reflect both the present structure of China’s 
international economic engagement, and a desire to appear as WTO compatible as possible in 
these agreements (given the incomplete nature of China’s WTO accession process). But as 
China’s trade patterns and interest in her interaction with other economies evolves this may 
change. Thus in not being forward looking in terms of coverage of future interests these 
agreements may be less reflective of China's interests. 
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
  
  This paper discusses the emerging network of regional trade agreements that China is 
now involved in negotiating following her accession to the WTO in 2002. An initial and 
subsequently elaborated free trade agreement with Hong Kong has been concluded and notified 
to WTO. A similar agreement with Macao is in place. Initial agreements also exist with ASEAN, 
Australia, and New Zealand, and discussions are underway with India, South Africa, Singapore, 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, and others.  
 
  The paper highlights the main features of these agreements; their relative brevity, the 
substantial differences between them, their focus more on trade in goods and services rather than 
non WTO matters, the absence of formal dispute resolution, and a negotiating style of initial 
agreements followed by subsequent elaboration rather than one-off treaty negotiation. 
 
  The paper concludes with a discussion of how the Chinese national interest may be 
served by these agreements, arguing that assymetries in size and power in the trading system 
seemingly produce an inevitable two tier system of large power non discriminatory arrangements 
reflected in common multilateral disciplines, and regional agreements negotiated by large powers 
with smaller countries going beyond these disciplines where the large power has the dominant 
interest. In this sense, the issue for China may not be whether they should have negotiated these 
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